Evidence from Goodwill Non-Impairments on the Effects of Using Unverifiable Estimates in Financial Reporting

Executive Summary:

SFAS 142 is an accounting rule that requires managers to use estimates of their firms' discounted future values to determine goodwill write-offs. Such estimates are different from the discretion historically afforded in financial reporting in that they are ex post unverifiable. For example, under the standard, a manager of a single-reporting-unit firm can avoid a goodwill write-off despite market indications to the contrary by generating a hypothetical firm value that exceeds the firm's liquid market value. Ex post, if the firm value used to justify non-impairment is not realized, the manager can claim it was due to factors outside his control (e.g., macroeconomic conditions), which is difficult to verify or falsify in a court of law. By promulgating SFAS 142, standard setters must implicitly assume that managers will, on average, use unverifiable discretion to convey private information on future cash flows. In contrast, agency theory predicts managers will, on average, use unverifiable discretion opportunistically. HBS professor Karthik Ramanna and MIT Sloan School professor Ross L. Watts investigate managers' implementation of the goodwill impairment test in SFAS 142 in a sample of firms with market indications of goodwill impairment. Key concepts include:

• Overall, the data do not confirm that the high frequency of non-impairment in the sample is due to management's possession of favorable private information.
• The results of this study highlight the potential costs of unverifiable fair values in SFAS 142, but they cannot rule out that SFAS 142 is net beneficial.