Alvin E. Roth
There are 7 articles for this faculty member.
How Economics May Lead to Better Football Games
| Q&A with: | Alvin E. Roth |
|---|---|
| Published: | September 29, 2008 |
| Feature: | Research & Ideas |
When economists watch football games they see more than flying pigskin and stadiums overflowing with fans. In the case of U.S. college football, Harvard Business School professor Alvin E. Roth along with Guillaume R. Fréchette and M. Utku Ünver studied the timing of team selection for championship bowls. What they found: Good teams are much better matched up than they used to be, and there are implications beyond sports. Q&A with Al Roth.
Unraveling Yields Inefficient Matchings: Evidence from Post-Season College Football Bowls
| Authors: | Guillaume R. Fréchette, Alvin E. Roth, and M. Utku Ünver |
|---|---|
| Published: | August 29, 2008 |
| Paper Release Date: | July 2008 |
| Feature: | Working Papers |
Many market institutions have evolved to coordinate the timing of transactions and to prevent them from taking place too early or at uncoordinated times. In the case of post-season college football games, called "bowls," during the early 1990s the determination of which teams would play in which bowls was often made with several games still remaining to be played in the regular season. Practically speaking, this meant that the teams with the best end-of-season records might not play one another, because at the time the matchings were determined it wasn't yet known which teams these would be. Over the last decade, however, this market has undergone a number of reorganizations that have delayed this matching decision until the end of the regular season. For this working paper, the authors used Nielsen rating data on television viewership and the AP sportswriters' poll of team rankings to show that, by matching later, the chance of matching the best teams has increased, and the result is an increase in television viewership.
Published in 2007
Repugnant Markets and How They Get That Way
| Q&A with: | Alvin E. Roth |
|---|---|
| Published: | July 30, 2007 |
| Feature: | Research & Ideas |
Repugnance is different in different places and at different times, says Harvard economist Alvin E. Roth in this Q&A. As someone who designs and builds new markets, he marvels at how society decides whether a transaction is "good" or "bad"—even when such transactions are very much alike.
Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets
| Author: | Alvin Roth |
|---|---|
| Published: | May 24, 2007 |
| Paper Release Date: | April 2007 |
| Feature: | Working Papers |
While some kinds of transactions are repugnant at certain times and places, they are considered perfectly acceptable in other situations. This essay examines a wide range of examples, including the buying and selling of kidneys for transplantation. Repugnance has important consequences for the transactions and markets we see.
Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
| Authors: | Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth |
|---|---|
| Published: | May 22, 2007 |
| Paper Release Date: | April 2007 |
| Feature: | Working Papers |
One of the goals of school matching systems is to limit the extent to which students and parents feel it necessary to "game the system" to be accepted at a favored school. Several years ago, the authors of this paper assisted the New York City Department of Education in redesigning the way it matched over 90,000 students entering public high schools each year. The situation in New York City is a hybrid: Some schools actively rank potential students, others have no preferences, and still others fall in between. This paper concentrates on the welfare considerations and incentives that arise in school choice due to the fact that many students are regarded by schools as equivalent. The research develops and expands on economic theory demanded by the design of school choice mechanisms.
Published in 2006
When Rights of First Refusal Are a Bad Deal
| Q&A with: | Alvin E. Roth |
|---|---|
| Published: | February 27, 2006 |
| Feature: | Research & Ideas |
Contracts that include a right of first refusal usually benefit the holder of that right. But not always. New research by professor Alvin E. Roth and colleague Brit Grosskopf explains when it's wise to say no.
Published in 2005
Amazon, eBay and the Bidding Wars
| Q&A with: | Alvin E. Roth |
|---|---|
| Published: | February 28, 2005 |
| Feature: | Research & Ideas |
"Sniping" is a popular way of winning a bid in the world of online auctions. But how far can it change the playing field? HBS professor Alvin Roth takes a look at how bidding rules change the way the game is played.
