Benjamin G. Edelman
There are 9 articles for this faculty member.
Demographics, Career Concerns or Social Comparison: Who Games SSRN Download Counts?
| Authors: | Benjamin G. Edelman and Ian I. Larkin |
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| Published: | March 25, 2009 |
| Paper Release Date: | February 2009 |
| Feature: | Working Papers |
Why do certain individuals commit fraudulent acts—in this case repeatedly downloading their own working papers from the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) repository to increase the papers' reported download counts? HBS professors Benjamin G. Edelman and Ian I. Larkin study the relative importance of demographic, economic, and psychological factors leading individuals to commit this kind of gaming. Authors engage in deceptive self-downloading to improve a paper's visibility on SSRN, to obtain more favorable assessments of paper quality, and to obtain possible benefits for promotion and tenure decisions at those schools that consider download counts in tenure decisions. Data indicates that authors are more likely to inflate their papers' download counts when a higher count greatly improves the visibility of a paper on the SSRN network. Authors are also more likely to inflate their papers' download counts when their peers recently had successful papers—suggesting an "envy" effect in download gaming. Download inflations are also affected somewhat by career concerns (e.g. just before changing jobs) and by demographic factors, though these effects are smaller. On the whole, analysis suggests a heightened risk of fraudulent acts not only where economic returns are high, but also where prestige, status, or reputation are important.
Running Out of Numbers: Scarcity of IP Addresses and What To Do About It
| Author: | Benjamin Edelman |
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| Published: | March 16, 2009 |
| Paper Release Date: | February 2009, revised March 2009 |
| Feature: | Working Papers |
Hidden from view of typical users, every Internet communication relies on an underlying system of numbers to identify data sources and destinations. Users typically specify online destinations by entering domain names (e.g. "congress.gov"). But the Internet's routers forward data according to numeric IP addresses (e.g. 140.147.249.9). To date, the Internet has enjoyed an ample supply of "IPv4" IP addresses, but demand is substantial and growing. Current allocation rates suggest IPv4 exhaustion by approximately 2011. A new numbering system, IPv6, would relieve scarcity, but incentives hinder transition: IPv4 works well for existing networks, and offers easier and simpler access to existing Internet content and services. As a result, to date few networks have begun to support v6. In principle regulators could order networks to implement v6, but the applicable Internet coordinating organizations lack authority or power to force such a transition. In the meantime, a market mechanism for v4 addresses offers important benefits, including allocating scarce v4 addresses to those who need them most, and putting a positive price on v4 space in order to encourage transition to v6. Thus, it seems v4 transfers can help both to mitigate the worst effects of v4 scarcity, and to build the incentives necessary for transition to v6.
When the Internet Runs Out of IP Addresses
| Q&A with: | Benjamin G. Edelman |
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| Published: | March 16, 2009 |
| Feature: | Research & Ideas |
Experts predict that within three years we will see the last of new Web addresses. What will happen then? The best solution is to create a market for already assigned but unwanted numbers, says Harvard Business School professor Ben Edelman.
CPC/CPA Hybrid Bidding in a Second Price Auction
| Authors: | Benjamin Edelman and Hoan Soo Lee |
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| Published: | March 5, 2009 |
| Paper Release Date: | December 2008 |
| Feature: | Working Papers |
How should online advertisers measure and pay for advertising deliveries? Options include pay per impression (CPM), per click (CPC), per action (CPA), or in proportion of the dollar value of merchandise sold. The advertisers who choose to pay one way may differ, systematically, from those who choose to pay in some other way. HBS professor Benjamin Edelman and doctoral student Hoan Soo Lee present the problem in an algebraic model in anticipation of measurement to follow in future work.
Published in 2008
Securing Online Advertising: Rustlers and Sheriffs in the New Wild West
| Author: | Benjamin G. Edelman |
|---|---|
| Published: | October 7, 2008 |
| Paper Release Date: | September 2008 |
| Feature: | Working Papers |
Online advertising remains a "Wild West" where users are faced with ads they ought not believe and where firms overpay for ads without getting the results they were promised. But it doesn't have to be this way. Enforcement by public agencies is starting to remind advertisers and ad networks that long-standing consumer protection rules still apply online. And as advertisers become more sophisticated, they're less likely to tolerate opaque charges for services they can't confirm they received. During the past five years, Edelman has uncovered hundreds of online advertising scams defrauding thousands of users, including all the Web's top merchants. This chapter summarizes some of what he has found and what users and advertisers can do to protect themselves.
Google-Yahoo Ad Deal is Bad for Online Advertising
| Published: | August 12, 2008 |
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| Feature: | Op-Ed |
A proposed advertising deal between Internet competitors Google and Yahoo would reduce competitiveness in the Internet advertising market, likely resulting in higher advertising rates, says Harvard Business School professor Benjamin G. Edelman.
Optimal Deterrence when Judgment-Proof Agents Are Paid In Arrears—With an Application to Online Advertising Fraud
| Author: | Benjamin G. Edelman |
|---|---|
| Published: | March 24, 2008 |
| Paper Release Date: | February 2008 |
| Feature: | Working Papers |
It is commonplace for large entities (both advertisers and ad networks) to enter into relationships with numerous small agents such as Web sites, blogs, search syndicators, and other marketing partners. For example, one well-known affiliate network boasts more than a million affiliates promoting offers from the network's hundreds of merchants, and Google contracts with numerous independent Web sites to show Google's "AdSense" ads. Although these advertising agents are often small, they can take advantage of technology to claim payments they have not earned. In practice, the legal system cannot offer meaningful redress to an aggrieved advertiser or ad network. This paper argues that delayed payment offers a more expedient alternative—a sensible stopgap strategy for use when primary enforcement systems prove inadequate.
Reducing Risk with Online Advertising
| Q&A with: | Benjamin G. Edelman |
|---|---|
| Published: | March 24, 2008 |
| Feature: | Research & Ideas |
Fraud is fairly easy in the world of online advertising, particularly for determined adversaries. In this Q&A, HBS professor Ben Edelman, who designs electronic markets, explains how contract terms can be managed to both reduce advertisers' risks of being defrauded and reward good suppliers. "The idea here is to make everyone better off, except of course the fraudsters," Edelman says.
On Best-Response Bidding in GSP Auctions
| Authors: | Matthew Cary, Aparna Das, Benjamin G. Edelman, Ioannis Giotis, Kurtis Heimerl, Anna R. Karlin, Claire Mathieu, and Michael Schwarz |
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| Published: | February 6, 2008 |
| Paper Release Date: | January 2008 |
| Feature: | Working Papers |
Keyword auctions have become a critical source of revenue for Google and Yahoo!, among others. This new form of advertising has provided a new way for advertisers to reach customers. But advertisers also face the complex task of optimizing bids to increase their exposure while avoiding unnecessary costs. HBS professor Benjamin Edelman and colleagues analyzed a class of bidding strategies that attempt to increase advertiser utility under limited assumptions about other players' behavior. Under a strategy they call Balanced Bidding (BB), advertisers converge to the advertiser-preferred equilibrium—achieving stability of bids and reducing advertisers' costs relative to other possible outcomes.













