Eric D. Werker
There are 9 articles for this faculty member.
Misgovernance at the World Bank
| Q&A with: | Eric D. Werker |
|---|---|
| Published: | April 20, 2009 |
| Feature: | Research & Ideas |
Board members may be inclined to advance their own interests at voting time. This appears true for the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors, too. The problem? Many countries are being shut out of development funding. New research by Harvard Law School student Ashwin Kaja and HBS professor Eric Werker tells why misgovernance at the World Bank should be corrected.
Corporate Misgovernance at the World Bank
| Authors: | Ashwin Kaja and Eric Werker |
|---|---|
| Published: | April 20, 2009 |
| Paper Release Date: | March 2009 |
| Feature: | Working Papers |
This paper examines the politics of corporate governance at the world's largest appropriations committee, the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors, and exposes a weakness in the design of the World Bank's decision-making structure. Any large public organization faces a challenge of representation and management. Since all decisions cannot be made by all members, founders often grant a more nimble body with decision-making powers. But representatives on the decision-making body may face a temptation to govern in the interests of their own wallet or narrow constituency rather than in the interests of the larger body. In 2008, the Bank's two primary component institutions—the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA)—committed nearly $25 billion in loans and grants through some 300 development projects around the globe. Where did it go? By exploring the political dynamics and corporate governance of an international appropriations committee, we not only learn about international organizations but also the nature of the international system itself.
Published in 2008
Do Voters Appreciate Responsive Governments? Evidence from Indian Disaster Relief
| Authors: | Shawn A. Cole, Andrew Healy, and Eric D. Werker |
|---|---|
| Published: | October 30, 2008 |
| Paper Release Date: | October 2008 |
| Feature: | Working Papers |
In a functioning democracy, politicians' ability to win reelection declines when they perform poorly. This idea fits well with models of political accountability. Recent evidence suggests, however, that voters may punish politicians even for events outside their control. This behavior may violate standard models of democratic accountability, and has been advanced as evidence of voter irrationality. This paper uses detailed weather, electoral, and relief data to identify the relationship between government responsiveness to an emergency and electoral decisions. Specifically, the authors look at the decisions that Indian voters made in provincial elections, using the intensity of the monsoon rains as an exogenous shock to welfare. They find that voters, on average, punish incumbent politicians for being in office during weather events beyond their control. However, the degree of voter punishment is reduced somewhat when the government responds more vigorously to the crisis.
What Do Non-Governmental Organizations Do?
| Authors: | Eric D. Werker and Faisal Z. Ahmed |
|---|---|
| Published: | January 25, 2008 |
| Paper Release Date: | December 2007 |
| Feature: | Working Papers |
Non-governmental organizations play an increasingly important role in international development. They serve as a funnel for development funds both from individual donors in wealthy countries and from bilateral aid agencies. At the same time, NGOs are frequently idealized as organizations committed to "doing good" while setting aside profit or politics—a romantic view that is too starry-eyed. Development-oriented NGOs, which have existed for centuries, have played a growing role in development since the end of World War II; there are currently 20,000 international NGOs. This paper argues that the strengths of NGOs and their weaknesses easily fit into economists' conceptualization of not-for-profit contractors.
The Political Economy of "Natural" Disasters
| Authors: | Charles Cohen and Eric D. Werker |
|---|---|
| Published: | January 16, 2008 |
| Paper Release Date: | December 2007 |
| Feature: | Working Papers |
With the onset of global warming, it is likely that the incidence of natural shocks will only increase in the years ahead. In addition, rising inequality between rich and poor countries combined with a commitment on the part of developed countries to increase foreign aid disbursements indicates that international relief in natural disasters will grow. Disaster relief is one of the most basic and important transfers of wealth between developed and developing countries. This paper argues that the relief enters and affects a highly political situation. It also argues that the political economy of natural disasters is understandable and predictable, and may be mitigated.
Published in 2007
Company Town: Fixing Corrupt Governments
| Published: | August 1, 2007 |
|---|---|
| Feature: | Op-Ed |
Too many democracies are ruled by corrupt leaders, says HBS professor Eric Werker. So how about letting good corporate citizens run for elected office in Third World regions?
How is Foreign Aid Spent? Evidence from a Compelling Natural Experiment
| Authors: | Eric Werker, Faisal Z. Ahmed and Charles Cohen |
|---|---|
| Published: | May 15, 2007 |
| Paper Release Date: | April 2007 |
| Feature: | Working Papers |
Foreign aid is viewed as a transfer of resources that can be used to generate meaningful growth in the recipient country's economy. How this aid is ultimately spent, therefore, determines how effective it is in achieving its purposes. Yet economists to date possess little understanding of how foreign aid trickles through a country's economy. This paper examines a foreign aid windfall that poorer Muslim countries have systematically received from rich, oil-producing Arab states. When the price of oil skyrocketed during the 1973-1986 oil crisis (and again after 2001), OPEC nations took a substantial portion of the money they received and gave it away as foreign aid, mostly to Muslim nations. When the price of oil crashed and income plunged in the oil-producing countries, the aid dried up. Werker, Ahmed, and Cohen examined the short-term effect of foreign aid on aggregate demand, the components of gross domestic product, and the balance of payments.
Published in 2006
How South Africa Challenges Our Thinking on FDI
| Q&A with: | Eric D. Werker |
|---|---|
| Published: | November 6, 2006 |
| Feature: | Research & Ideas |
After the fall of apartheid, South Africa accepted the standard prescription for countries to receive more foreign direct investment. Yet FDI has been a mere trickle. Why? The answer may reside in the country's strong corporate environment, says HBS professor Eric D. Werker.
Male Circumcision and AIDS: The Macroeconomic Impact of a Health Crisis
| Authors: | Eric D. Werker, Amrita Ahuja, and Brian Wendell |
|---|---|
| Published: | November 2, 2006 |
| Paper Release Date: | October 2006 |
| Feature: | Working Papers |
The AIDS epidemic is a humanitarian disaster that has struck sub-Saharan Africa with particular severity, but its macroeconomic impact is much less certain. Though conflicting theories abound, empirically-based studies on the link between HIV prevalence rates and economic growth have shown no consensus. Given the significant medical evidence that male circumcision can reduce the risk of contracting HIV in Africa, tribal circumcision practices provide an "experimental" setting to test the impact of the AIDS epidemic on the overall economy.
