Why Do Countries Adopt International Financial Reporting Standards?
| Authors: | Karthik Ramanna and Ewa Sletten |
|---|---|
| Published: | June 25, 2009 |
| Paper Release Date: | March 2009 |
| Feature: | Working Papers |
Why do some countries adopt the European Union (EU)-based International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) when others do not? To expand our understanding of the determinants and consequences of IFRS adoption on a global sample, HBS professor Karthik Ramanna and MIT Sloan School of Management coauthor Ewa Sletten studied variations over time in the decision to adopt these standards in more than a hundred non-EU countries. Understanding countries' adoption decisions can provide insights into the benefits and costs of IFRS adoption.
Published in 2008
Accounting Information as Political Currency
| Authors: | Karthik Ramanna and Sugata Roychowdhury |
|---|---|
| Published: | June 19, 2008 |
| Paper Release Date: | May 2008 |
| Feature: | Working Papers |
The study of accounting and the political process has long been viewed through the political cost hypothesis, the basic premise of which is that firms manage earnings in order to extract first-order benefits (or avoid first-order costs) from regulators. This paper develops and tests a distinct, yet likely, complementary hypothesis: Firms manage reported earnings in order to supply first-order benefits to regulators. Focusing on Democratic and Republican candidates in congressional races in 2004, Ramanna and Roychowdhury test whether the management of accounting information is in some circumstances akin to a political contribution from firms to politicians: in other words, whether accounting information can be used as political currency. The authors predict and find that identified corporate donors to candidates in closely watched races in 2004 managed information related to outsourcing, a hot-button issue in those races.
Published in 2007
Contracting in the Self-reporting Economy
| Authors: | Romana L. Autrey and Richard Sansing |
|---|---|
| Published: | June 26, 2007 |
| Paper Release Date: | June 2007 (revised October 2009) |
| Feature: | Working Papers |
Intellectual property can be used by its owner directly, licensed to a third party for a fixed royalty, or licensed to a third party for a variable royalty. The variable royalty arrangement depends on self-reporting by the licensee, which in turn induces demand for auditing by the licensor. This research studies a setting with the following features: a production cost advantage on the part of the outside party that creates gains from licensing; a limited liability constraint that prevents the licensee from owing more royalties than the gross profits of licensing the intellectual property and prevents the licensor from capturing all of the economic surplus via a fixed royalty agreement; and accounting and auditing costs that reduce the benefits of a variable royalty agreement.
Published in 2006
Financial Reporting Goes Global
| Q&A with: | Gregory S. Miller and V.G. Narayanan |
|---|---|
| Published: | January 23, 2006 |
| Feature: | Research & Ideas |
Globalization is the key issue in determining the future of financial accounting, says professor Gregory S. Miller. And as more countries consider adopting an international accounting standard, India is positioned to be a strong leader.
Published in 2003
Are Conditions Right for the Next Accounting Scandal?
| Published: | March 3, 2003 |
|---|---|
| Feature: | What Do YOU Think? |
| Forum: | closed | 12 Comments posted |
Will risk-averse corporate audit committees' natural tendencies to engage the biggest accounting firms insure that the current accounting oligopoly will become even stronger?
Published in 2002
Most Accountants Aren't Crooks—Why Good Audits Go Bad
| Published: | December 9, 2002 |
|---|---|
| Feature: | Research & Ideas |
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act sets stiff penalties for auditors and executives who commit fraud. Problem is, says Harvard Business School professor Max H. Bazerman and his collaborators, most bad audits are the result of unconscious bias, not corruption. Here's a new look at how to audit the auditors.
