Author Abstract
When powerful people cause harm, they often do so indirectly through other people. Are harmful actions carried out through others evaluated less negatively than harmful actions carried out directly? Four experiments examine the moral psychology of indirect agency. Experiment 1 reveals effects of indirect agency under conditions favoring intuitive judgment, but not reflective judgment, using a joint/separate evaluation paradigm. Experiment 2 demonstrates that effects of indirect agency cannot be explained by perceived lack of foreknowledge or control on the part of the primary agent. Experiment 3 indicates that reflective moral judgment is sensitive to indirect agency, but only to the extent that indirectness signals reduced foreknowledge and/or control. Experiment 4 indicates that effects of indirect agency result from a failure to automatically consider the potentially dubious motives of agents who cause harm indirectly.
Paper Information
- Full Working Paper Text
- Working Paper Publication Date: August 2008, revised January 2009
- HBS Working Paper Number: 09-012
- Faculty Unit(s): Negotiation, Organizations & Markets