What is the role of fair values in the current economic crisis? The interplay between information risk—that is, uncertainty regarding valuation parameters for an underlying asset—and the reporting of financial instruments at fair value has been a subject of high-level policy debate. Finance theory suggests that information risk is reflected in firms' equity betas and the information asymmetry component of bid-ask spreads. HBS professor Edward Riedl and doctoral candidate George Serafeim test predictions for a sample of large U.S. banks, exploiting recent mandatory disclosures of financial instruments designated as fair value level 1, 2, and 3, which indicate progressively more illiquid and opaque financial instruments. Overall, banks with higher exposures to level 3 financial assets have both higher equity betas and higher bid-ask spreads. Both results are consistent with higher levels of information risk, and thus cost of capital, for these firms.
Do insiders strategically sell their stock holdings prior to the accounting disclosure of goodwill impairment losses? While a number of recent studies provide evidence of insider trading prior to the announcement of earnings performance measures, a remaining puzzle is what types of information aggregated into reported earnings constitute the source of insiders' private information. This study provides evidence of a specific reporting item, goodwill impairments, about which insiders are able to strategically trade before its full discovery by the equity market and its recognition within the financial statements. Goodwill impairments represent likely sources of information for insiders to trade on for two reasons. First, they tend to be economically large, averaging 11.9 percent of the market value of equity during the sample period of 2002-2007. Second, managers likely have material private information regarding future cash flow estimates through their internal budgeting processes; and managers' private information advantage may be relatively long-lived due to goodwill impairment testing rules that may delay the accounting recognition of economic goodwill impairments.
Why do some countries adopt the European Union (EU)-based International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) when others do not? To expand our understanding of the determinants and consequences of IFRS adoption on a global sample, HBS professor Karthik Ramanna and MIT Sloan School of Management coauthor Ewa Sletten studied variations over time in the decision to adopt these standards in more than a hundred non-EU countries. Understanding countries' adoption decisions can provide insights into the benefits and costs of IFRS adoption.
How does the political process affect accounting? During the 2004 U.S. congressional elections, outsourcing of American jobs was a major campaign issue. Because outsourcing is assumed to be net profitable, the use of income-decreasing accruals would enable donor firms to deflect public scrutiny of both the firm and the political candidate over outsourcing. HBS professor Karthik Ramanna and MIT Sloan School professor Sugata Roychowdhury examine the accrual choices made by outsourcing firms with links to U.S. congressional candidates during the 2004 elections, and specifically test for income-decreasing discretionary accruals. Evidence is consistent with firms using earnings management to reduce both direct political costs and the costs associated with causing embarrassment to affiliated political candidates.
SFAS 142 is an accounting rule that requires managers to use estimates of their firms' discounted future values to determine goodwill write-offs. Such estimates are different from the discretion historically afforded in financial reporting in that they are ex post unverifiable. For example, under the standard, a manager of a single-reporting-unit firm can avoid a goodwill write-off despite market indications to the contrary by generating a hypothetical firm value that exceeds the firm's liquid market value. Ex post, if the firm value used to justify non-impairment is not realized, the manager can claim it was due to factors outside his control (e.g., macroeconomic conditions), which is difficult to verify or falsify in a court of law. By promulgating SFAS 142, standard setters must implicitly assume that managers will, on average, use unverifiable discretion to convey private information on future cash flows. In contrast, agency theory predicts managers will, on average, use unverifiable discretion opportunistically. HBS professor Karthik Ramanna and MIT Sloan School professor Ross L. Watts investigate managers' implementation of the goodwill impairment test in SFAS 142 in a sample of firms with market indications of goodwill impairment.
Gray market goods are brand-name products that are initially sold into a designated market but then resold through unofficial channels into a different market. Gray markets can arise when transaction and search costs are low enough to allow products to "leak" from one market segment back into another. Examples of industries with active gray markets include pharmaceuticals, automobiles, and electronics. Understandably, reactions to gray market encroachment are mixed. On the one hand, consumer advocates and governments have applauded the increasing role that gray markets have played in improving competition for domestic goods. On the other hand, multinationals have decried the increasing role of gray markets in the economy, with an estimated $40 billion in cannibalized sales resulting from gray markets in the information technology sector alone. This study investigates the optimal price of a multinational's internal transfers and the consequences of regulations mandating arm's-length transfer pricing.
Popular imagination often links two significant economic developments: the rapid escalation of the foreign activities of American multinational firms over the last 15 years, and rising levels of economic insecurity, particularly among workers in certain sectors. The presumed linkages between these phenomena have led many to call for a reconsideration of the tax treatment of foreign investment. Increasing the tax burden on outbound investment by American multinational firms, it is claimed, offers the promise of alleviating domestic employment losses and insecurity while also raising considerable revenue. HBS professor Mihir A. Desai looks beneath the trends, examining the economic determinants of outbound investment decisions and synthesizing what is known about the relationship between domestic and foreign activities.
Published in 2008
How do investors in European firms react to a change in financial reporting? Prior to 2005, most European firms applied domestic accounting standards. The adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) would result in the application of a common set of financial reporting standards within Europe, and between Europe and the many other countries that require or permit application of IFRS. However, modification of IFRS by European regulators would result in European standards differing from those used in other countries, thereby eliminating some potential convergence benefits. This study investigates the equity market reaction to 16 events associated with the adoption of IFRS in Europe. Overall, the researchers' findings are consistent with investors expecting the benefits associated with IFRS adoption in Europe to exceed the expected costs.
Do managers' presentation decisions within their financial statements reflect informational motivations (that is, revealing the underlying economics of the firm) or opportunistic motivations (that is, attempts to bias perceptions of firm performance)? The authors examine managers' choices to present special items (such as write-offs and restructuring charges) separately on the income statement rather than aggregated in other line items with disclosure only in the footnotes. Prior research suggests that managers engage in opportunistic reporting in other presentation decisions, and that managers' presentation decisions on the financial statement affects users' judgments. The distinction also matters because current changes in reporting standards are likely to increase the occurrence of "nonrecurring" type charges similar to special items, such as fair value changes.
The required adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in the
European Union, effective January 1, 2005, resulted in a number of significant changes in how firms report their financial results. Mandatory IFRS adoption has been criticized for both the flexibility afforded under the standards and the encroachment of the fair value paradigm. Specifically, common accounting standards alone may not be sufficient to provide the benefits of common accounting practices. This paper examines the causes and consequences of different forms of fair value disclosures for tangible long-lived assets. Insights may assist standard setters and users in understanding the factors influencing firms' current and future accounting choices, and may also interest U.S. standard setters and managers of the almost 250 publicly traded U.S. real estate firms.
The study of accounting and the political process has long been viewed through the political cost hypothesis, the basic premise of which is that firms manage earnings in order to extract first-order benefits (or avoid first-order costs) from regulators. This paper develops and tests a distinct, yet likely, complementary hypothesis: Firms manage reported earnings in order to supply first-order benefits to regulators. Focusing on Democratic and Republican candidates in congressional races in 2004, Ramanna and Roychowdhury test whether the management of accounting information is in some circumstances akin to a political contribution from firms to politicians: in other words, whether accounting information can be used as political currency. The authors predict and find that identified corporate donors to candidates in closely watched races in 2004 managed information related to outsourcing, a hot-button issue in those races.
To what extent do balanced scorecards provide useful information for testing and validating an organization's strategy? Numerous case studies of balanced scorecard implementations document their use in translating organizational strategies to objectives and measures, communicating strategic objectives to employees, evaluating the performance of business units, and aligning the incentives of employees across business units and functions. There has been comparatively little research, however, on the potential learning and feedback role of balanced scorecards. Analyzing balanced scorecard data from Store24—a privately held convenience store retailer in New England—during the implementation of an innovative but ultimately unsuccessful strategy, this study investigates whether, when, and how information about problems with the firm's strategy was captured in the multiple performance measures of its balanced scorecard.
Corporate donors that gave at least $10,000 to closely watched races in the U.S. congressional elections of 2004 were more likely to understate their earnings, say Harvard Business School's Karthik Ramanna and MIT colleague Sugata Roychowdhury. Such "downward earnings management" may have functioned as a political contribution. In this Q&A, Ramanna explains how accounting and politics influence each other.
Chain organizations operate units that are typically dispersed across different types of markets, and thus serve significantly different customer bases. Such "market-type dispersion" is likely to compromise the headquarters' ability to control its stores for two reasons: Relative differences in local conditions make it difficult to monitor a store manager's behavior, and a chain with wide-ranging customer bases will have a harder time serving its customers and will need to rely more heavily on store managers' ability to adapt to local needs. This study identifies market-type dispersion as a factor that is systematically related to firms' organizational design choices. The results may help managers and consultants who deal with control challenges related to a chain's geographic expansion into different markets.
Mexico was the first emerging market compelled to reformulate the financial reporting of its banks as a result of a financial crisis. In the last decade, Mexico has undergone a process of internationalization of its banking industry. Today, more than 80 percent of the equity of Mexican banks belongs to internationally active bank corporations. This internationalization demands more transparent regulation, including standardized accounting rules and better disclosure of information. The case of Mexico can therefore serve as an example of the relevance of these changes, as well as of their scope and limitations. This paper attempts to clarify the nature and structure of the new accounting standards, and explains how they have affected financial statements and their interpretation.
Published in 2007
Since the late 1990s, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has pressed for the use of fair values in accounting. When such fair values are based on verifiable market prices, they are less likely to be managed. However, in some FASB standards, fair values are based on managers' or appraisers' unverifiable subjective estimates. Agency theory suggests that managers will take advantage of this unverifiability to manage financial reports in order to extract rents. This paper considers a recent FASB standard known as SFAS 142, which relies on unverifiable fair-value estimates when accounting for acquired goodwill. The goal of the research is to see whether firms are using this standard to manage their financial reports.
Intellectual property can be used by its owner directly, licensed to a third party for a fixed royalty, or licensed to a third party for a variable royalty. The variable royalty arrangement depends on self-reporting by the licensee, which in turn induces demand for auditing by the licensor. This research studies a setting with the following features: a production cost advantage on the part of the outside party that creates gains from licensing; a limited liability constraint that prevents the licensee from owing more royalties than the gross profits of licensing the intellectual property and prevents the licensor from capturing all of the economic surplus via a fixed royalty agreement; and accounting and auditing costs that reduce the benefits of a variable royalty agreement.
Harvard Business School professor Mihir A. Desai recently presented testimony to a U.S. Senate subcommittee looking at the subject of executive stock options. His theme: A "dual-reporting system" makes it difficult for investors and tax authorities to learn the real numbers.
Determining a company's true costs and profitability has always been difficult, although advancements such as activity-based costing (ABC) have helped. In a new book, Professor Robert Kaplan and Acorn Systems' Steven Anderson offer a simplified system based on time-driven ABC that leverages existing enterprise resource planning systems.
When financial fraud is at stake, the press is a watchdog that bites more often than we think, says HBS professor Gregory S. Miller, an expert in financial communication. Many times, the press is on the case long before analysts or even the SEC. In this Q&A he describes what he learned and what managers should keep in mind.
Published in 2006
What corporations report in profit to the IRS and what they report to shareholders are often two different numbers—sometimes wildly so. That's why the IRS and Securities and Exchange Commission are proposing that companies publicly report taxes paid—and Professor Mihir Desai thinks this is only a first step.
Increased corporate financial reporting may benefit many parties, but not necessarily the companies themselves. New research from Harvard Business School professor Romana Autrey and coauthors looks at the relationship between executive performance and public disclosure.
A small but growing chorus of public company CEOs is deciding not to provide quarterly earnings guidance. Is this a good or bad development for shareholders, investors, analysts, the marketplace, and the company’s short- and long-term health?
Globalization is the key issue in determining the future of financial accounting, says professor Gregory S. Miller. And as more countries consider adopting an international accounting standard, India is positioned to be a strong leader.
Published in 2005
Activity-based accounting looks great in the classroom, but too often fails in the field. In this Harvard Business Review excerpt, HBS professor Robert S. Kaplan along with Steven R. Anderson suggest a way around the obstacles.
Published in 2004
Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that managers certify the integrity of their internal controls for financial reporting. In the end, are shareholders getting their money’s worth? Are more costly amendments to come?
It is well documented that financial analysts' opinions are reflected in stock prices. The problem: Analysts often operate under incentives that are inconsistent with telling the truth. Retail investors, who tend to be less sophisticated, may fail to make proper adjustments for the more nuanced of the resulting biases, some of which might be reflected in market prices. To study the scope of market efficiency, Scherbina studied analysts' incentives, resulting forecast biases, and their potential impact on market prices.
Foreign firms cross-listing on U.S. exchanges are learning that their biggest appeal to potential investors lies in a strong reputation. An interview with HBS professor Jordan Siegel.
Published in 2003
The earnings of all publicly owned organizations may soon take a hit as the organizations comply with various provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and new FASB rules. Are these and perhaps other "cures" to the corporate scandals really worth the cost to investors?
Activity-based costing (ABC) has become popular in business writing and management circles. (An example of an activity would be process customer complaints.) However, calculating baselines for activities, developing the model, and retesting the model once it is implemented is time-consuming and costly. Kaplan and Anderson developed improvements in the process through what they call time-driven ABC. Time-driven ABC decreases the amount of data needed, and only requires estimates of two things: (1) the practical capacity of committed resources and their cost, and (2) unit times for performing transactional activities.
Do the markets need an investor's union? Should company audits be overseen by stock exchanges? If you want to restore investor confidence, think radical reforms, say professors Paul Healy and Krishna Palepu.
Why doesn’t the budget process work? Read what experts say about not only changing your budgeting process, but whether your company should dispense with budgets entirely.
Will expensing stock options harm the competitiveness of start-ups? Not likely, say Zvi Bodie, Robert S. Kaplan, and Robert C. Merton in this Harvard Business Review excerpt.
Will risk-averse corporate audit committees' natural tendencies to engage the biggest accounting firms insure that the current accounting oligopoly will become even stronger?
Stock options for executives have certainly been abused, but reforms requiring companies to expense option grants on their financial statements don't solve the fundamental problems, argues Harvard Business School professor William A. Sahlman.
Published in 2002
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act sets stiff penalties for auditors and executives who commit fraud. Problem is, says Harvard Business School professor Max H. Bazerman and his collaborators, most bad audits are the result of unconscious bias, not corruption. Here's a new look at how to audit the auditors.
In an opinion piece in the Financial Times, Harvard Business School professor Jay Lorsch argues for legislation to create an independent, self-regulatory organization to oversee accounting firms. Enron, he says, is not an isolated incident.
Published in 2001
Not to mince words, but corporate budgeting is a joke, argues HBS professor emeritus Michael C. Jensen in this Harvard Business Review excerpt. The problem isn't with the budget process—it's when budget targets are used to determine compensation.
Published in 2000
