Kohlberg, Elon →

Demystifying the Math of the Coronavirus

This paper provides a conceptual model for the progression of COVID-19 that is somewhat imprecise but that’s very simple and easy to understand. By relying on this description, one can obtain a rough estimate of the impact of various social distancing measures on the rate of growth of new infections.

Games of Threats

The Shapley value is the most widely studied solution concept of cooperative game theory, with applications to cost allocation, fair division, voting, etc. It is defined on coalitional games, which are the standards objects of the theory. The authors extend the Shapley value solution beyond coalitional games to “games of threats,” which arise in applications that combine competitive and cooperative considerations.

Cooperative Strategic Games

The authors examine a solution concept for strategic games. In applications, this concept provides an a-priori assessment of the monetary worth of each player’s position; the assessment reflects the player’s contribution to the total payoff as well as the player’s ability to inflict losses on other players.

The Cooperative Solution of Stochastic Games

In its broadest sense a stochastic game is one in which, at each stage, the game is in one of a finite number of states. Each player chooses an action from a finite set of possible actions. The players' actions and the state jointly determine a payoff to each player and transition probabilities to the succeeding state. While the theory of stochastic games has been developed in many different directions, there has been practically no work on the interplay between stochastic games and cooperative game theory. In this paper, building on the work of leading theorists such as Nash, Harsanyi, and Shapley, the authors take an initial step in this direction, defining a cooperative solution for strategic games and proving an existence theorem. Closed for comment; 0 Comments.