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Results
- 13 Aug 2012
- Research & Ideas
When Good Incentives Lead to Bad Decisions
by Carmen Nobel
New research by Associate Professor Shawn A. Cole, Martin Kanz, and Leora Klapper explores how various compensation incentives affect lending decisions among bank loan officers. They find that incentives have the power to change not only how we make decisions, but how we perceive reality. Closed for comment; 10 Comment(s) posted.
Financial Regulation in a Quantitative Model of the Modern Banking System
This study at the intersection of macroeconomics and banking explores the optimal regulation of banks. Studying and quantifying the effects of capital requirements in a model that features regulated (commercial) and unregulated (shadow) banks, the authors find that a higher capital requirement makes regulated banks safer, but does not affect the riskiness of shadow banks. The net benefit of such a policy would depend on the level of fragility of the unregulated banks.