Should large institutional investors divest or engage if they have an issue with a company? In a recent case study, Vikram Gandhi discusses how CalSTRS, the $200 billion pension plan for California public school teachers, chose to engage with gun makers and retailers.
Open for comment; 0 Comment(s) posted.
How did the process of securitization transform trillions of dollars of risky assets into securities that many considered to be a safe bet? HBS professors Joshua D. Coval and Erik Stafford, with Princeton colleague Jakub Jurek, authors of a new paper, have ideas. Key concepts include: Over the past decade, risks have been repackaged to create triple-A-rated securities. Even modest imprecision in estimating underlying risks is magnified disproportionately when securities are pooled and tranched, as shown in a modeling exercise. Ratings of structured finance products, which make no distinction between the different sources of default risk, are particularly useless for determining prices and fair rates of compensation for these risks. Going forward, it would be best to eliminate any sanction of ratings as a guide to investment policy and capital requirements. It is important to focus on measuring and judging the system's aggregate amount of leverage and to understand the exposures that financial institutions actually have.
Closed for comment; 0 Comment(s) posted.
Risky Business with Structured Finance
How did the process of securitization transform trillions of dollars of risky assets into securities that many considered to be a safe bet? HBS professors Joshua D. Coval and Erik Stafford, with Princeton colleague Jakub Jurek, authors of a new paper, have ideas. Key concepts include: Over the past decade, risks have been repackaged to create triple-A-rated securities. Even modest imprecision in estimating underlying risks is magnified disproportionately when securities are pooled and tranched, as shown in a modeling exercise. Ratings of structured finance products, which make no distinction between the different sources of default risk, are particularly useless for determining prices and fair rates of compensation for these risks. Going forward, it would be best to eliminate any sanction of ratings as a guide to investment policy and capital requirements. It is important to focus on measuring and judging the system's aggregate amount of leverage and to understand the exposures that financial institutions actually have. Closed for comment; 0 Comment(s) posted.