Author Abstract
We find that missing quarterly earnings benchmarks, especially the analyst consensus earnings forecast, is associated with career penalties in the form of a reduced bonus, smaller equity grants, and a greater chance of forced dismissal for both CEOs and CFOs during the period 1993-2004. These results are obtained after controlling for the magnitude of the earnings surprise, operating and stock return performance, and are significant in a statistical and in an economic sense. Career penalties for failing to meet the analyst consensus estimate are higher for firms that give quarterly earnings guidance and in the post-SOX period. Our evidence suggests that (i) boards appear to react directly to managers' ability to meet earnings targets or to the information that is reflected in meeting such benchmarks; and (ii) senior managers' preoccupation with meeting earnings benchmarks might be based at least partly on career concerns. Download the paper also from the Social Science Research Network (SSRN).
Paper Information
- Full Working Paper Text
- Working Paper Publication Date: August 2008, revised June 2009
- HBS Working Paper Number: 09-014
- Faculty Unit(s): Accounting and Management
