First Look

Publications

Open to Negotiation: Phenomenological Assumptions and Knowledge Dissemination

Abstract

Phenomenological assumptions—assumptions about the fundamental qualities of the phenomenon being studied and how it relates to the environment in which it occurs—affect the dissemination of knowledge from subfields to the broader field of study. Micro-process research in organizational studies rests on implicit phenomenological assumptions that vary in the extent to which micro-processes are viewed as parts of larger systems. We suggest that phenomenological assumptions linking micro-processes to organizational contexts highlight the relevance of micro-process research findings to broader organizational questions, and therefore increase the likelihood that the findings will disseminate to the larger field of organizational research. We test this assertion by analyzing studies of negotiation published in top peer-reviewed management, psychology, sociology, and industrial relations journals from 1990 to 2005. Our findings reveal a continuum of open systems to closed systems phenomenological assumptions in negotiation research. Analysis of the citation rates of the articles in our data set by non-negotiation organizational research indicates that more open systems assumptions increase the likelihood that a negotiation article will be cited in organizational studies, after controlling for other, previously identified effects on citation rates. Our findings suggest that subfields can increase the impact they have on the broader intellectual discourse by situating their phenomena in rich contexts that illuminate the connections between their findings and questions of interest to the broader field.

Market Research and Innovation Strategy in a Duopoly

Abstract

We model a duopoly in which ex-ante identical firms must decide where to direct their innovation efforts. The firms face market uncertainty about consumers' preferences for innovation on two product attributes and technology uncertainty about the success of their R&D investments. Firms can conduct costly market research before setting R&D strategy. We find that the value of market information to a firm depends on whether its rival is expected to obtain this information in equilibrium. Consequently, one firm may forgo market research even though its rival conducts such research and learns the true state of demand. We examine both vertical and horizontal demand structures. With vertical preferences, firms are a priori uncertain which attribute all consumers will value more. In this case, a firm that conducts market research always attempts innovation on the attribute it discovers that consumers prefer and expends more on R&D than a rival that has not conducted market research. With horizontal preferences, distinct segments exist—each caring about innovation on only one attribute—and firms are a priori uncertain how many consumers each segment contains. In this case, a firm that conducts market research may follow a 'niche' strategy and attempt innovation to serve the smaller segment to avoid intense price competition for the larger segment. A firm that conducts market research may therefore invest less in R&D and earn lower post-launch profits than a rival that has forgone such research.

Backlash to Arbitration: Three Causes

Abstract

There are at least three reasons for the current backlash among developing countries against the international regime that governs disputes between foreign investors and host governments. First is the inconsistency of the decisions rendered by arbitration panels established under bilateral investment treaties, investment provisions of regional trade agreements, clauses in investment contracts, and, occasionally, provisions of host countries' investment laws. Second, and perhaps most important, is the very rigid view of contracts that panels have tended to take, even when a host country acts as a result of an economic crisis. A third cause of backlash is closely related to the second: the seeming insensitivity of arbitration panels to signals that corruption or incompetency might have been involved in the original negotiations or subsequent renegotiations of agreements that gave rise to disputes. There are other reasons for reaction, but they pose less threat to the existing system. Although the ideal solution would be a multilateral agreement, past efforts to conclude one suggest that reaching agreement is unlikely in the near future. Building an appellate process, providing for symmetry in access to arbitration, and mid-point guidance might go some distance toward reducing the backlash.