First Look

Abstract—We examine the business model of traditional commercial banks when they compete with shadow banks. While both types of intermediaries create safe "money-like" claims, they go about this in different ways. Traditional banks create money-like claims by holding illiquid fixed-income assets to maturity, and they rely on deposit insurance and costly equity capital to support this strategy. This strategy allows bank depositors to remain "sleepy": they do not have to pay attention to transient fluctuations in the market value of bank assets. In contrast, shadow banks create money-like claims by giving their investors an early exit option requiring the rapid liquidation of assets. Thus, traditional banks have a stable source of funding, while shadow banks are subject to runs and fire-sale losses. In equilibrium, traditional banks have a comparative advantage at holding fixed-income assets that have only modest fundamental risk but are illiquid and have substantial transitory price volatility, whereas shadow banks tend to hold relatively liquid assets.

Publisher's link: http://www.people.hbs.edu/shanson/banks_20150305_FINAL.pdf

Abstract—Formal contracts represent an important governance instrument with which firms exercise control of and compensate partners in R&D projects. The specific type of contract used, however, can vary significantly across projects. In some, firms govern partnering relationships through fixed-price contracts, whereas in others, firms use more flexible time and materials or performance-based contracts. How do these choices affect the costs and benefits that arise from greater levels of partner integration? Furthermore, how are these relationships affected when the choice of contract is misaligned with the scope and objectives of the partnering relationship? Our study addresses these questions using data from 172 R&D projects that involve partners. We find that i) greater partner integration is associated with higher project costs for all contract types; ii) greater partner integration is associated with higher product quality only in projects that adopt more flexible time and materials or performance-based contracts; and iii) in projects where the choice of contract is misaligned with the scope and objectives of the partnering relationship, greater partner integration is associated with higher costs, but not with higher product quality. Our results shed light on the subtle interplay between formal and relational contracting. They have important implications for practice, with respect to designing optimal governance structures in partnered R&D projects.

Abstract—How can firms design collaboration structures for effective performance in R&D projects that involve multiple partners? To address this question, we examine the theoretical underpinnings of collaboration structures in multi-partner R&D projects-i.e., the scale and the scope of partnering efforts. Partnering scale captures the extent of resource interdependencies between a firm and its partners; partnering scope captures both the breadth and depth of the interdependencies between a firm and its partners. Using primary data from 147 multi-partner R&D projects, we develop and test hypotheses that examine the impact of partnering scale and scope decisions on partnering performance. Results indicate that partnering scale has a curvilinear relationship with partnering performance. That is, intermediate levels of partnering scale are associated with higher partnering performance, compared to low or high levels of partnering scale. However, we also find that the nature of this relationship is moderated by the sub-dimensions of partnering scope. Specifically, increase in partnering breadth appears to magnify the negative effect of partnering scale on performance. In contrast, increase in partnering depth appears to overcome this negative effect, allowing firms to operate at higher levels of partnering scale. Taken together, these results highlight the importance of adopting a comprehensive approach to designing collaboration structures for multi-partner R&D projects.

Publisher's link: http://dx.doi.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/10.1016/j.jom.2014.09.008

Abstract—In fields as diverse as technology entrepreneurship and the arts, crowds of interested stakeholders are increasingly responsible for deciding which innovations to fund, a privilege that was previously reserved for a few experts, such as venture capitalists and grant‐making bodies. Little is known about the degree to which the crowd differs from experts in judging which ideas to fund, and, indeed, whether the crowd is even rational in making funding decisions. Drawing on a panel of national experts and comprehensive data from the largest crowdfunding site, we examine funding decisions for proposed theater projects, a category where expert and crowd preferences might be expected to differ greatly. We instead find substantial agreement between the funding decisions of crowds and experts. Where crowds and experts disagree, it is far more likely to be a case where the crowd is willing to fund projects that experts may not. Examining the outcomes of these projects, we find no quantitative or qualitative differences between projects funded by the crowd alone, and those that were selected by both the crowd and experts. Our findings suggest that crowdfunding can play an important role in complementing expert decisions, particularly in sectors where the crowds are end users, by allowing projects the option to receive multiple evaluations and thereby lowering the incidence of "false negatives."

Publisher's link: http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/14-116%20(3)_5dfe7025-e2cc-4e07-bfb4-f4204ae3d52c.pdf