Skip to Main Content
HBS Home
  • About
  • Academic Programs
  • Alumni
  • Faculty & Research
  • Baker Library
  • Giving
  • Harvard Business Review
  • Initiatives
  • News
  • Recruit
  • Map / Directions
Working Knowledge
Business Research for Business Leaders
  • Browse All Articles
  • Popular Articles
  • Cold Call Podcast
  • Managing the Future of Work Podcast
  • About Us
  • Book
  • Leadership
  • Marketing
  • Finance
  • Management
  • Entrepreneurship
  • All Topics...
  • Topics
    • COVID-19
    • Entrepreneurship
    • Finance
    • Gender
    • Globalization
    • Leadership
    • Management
    • Negotiation
    • Social Enterprise
    • Strategy
  • Sections
    • Book
    • Podcasts
    • HBS Case
    • In Practice
    • Lessons from the Classroom
    • Op-Ed
    • Research & Ideas
    • Research Event
    • Sharpening Your Skills
    • What Do You Think?
  • Browse All
    Monopolistic Competition Between Differentiated Products With Demand For More Than One Variety
    28 May 2009Working Paper Summaries

    Monopolistic Competition Between Differentiated Products With Demand For More Than One Variety

    by Andrei Hagiu
    How and when is price competition most significant among firms? This paper develops a theoretical framework for studying price competition between multiple firms. Two examples of markets that fit the description for study are software applications and videogames: There are thousands of software applications as well as games, and different users are interested in different applications and/or games. A given software or game user's tastes may overlap with another's, yet they may have nothing in common with a third's. Thus, although there is a sense in which competition is localized (any given firm competes only with firms whose brands are similar to its own), it is not clear how the fact that consumers are generally interested in purchasing multiple products affects the type of competition waged among firms. Key concepts include:
    • This paper proposes a theoretical framework for studying competition between differentiated products when consumers are interested in purchasing more than one brand.
    LinkedIn
    Email

    Author Abstract

    We analyze the existence of pure strategy symmetric price equilibria in a generalized version of Salop (1979)'s circular model of competition between differentiated products—namely, we allow consumers to purchase more than one brand. When consumers purchase all varieties from which they derive non-negative net utility, there is no competition, so that each firm behaves like an unconstrained monopolist. When each consumer is interested in purchasing an exogenously given number (n) of varieties, we show that there is no pure strategy symmetric price equilibrium in general (for n > 2 with linear transportation costs). In turn, if the limitation on the number of varieties consumers purchase comes from a budget constraint then we obtain a multiplicity of symmetric price equilibria, which can be indexed by the number of varieties consumers purchase in equilibrium. Keywords: Monopolistic competition, Product Variety. 48 pages.

    Paper Information

    • Full Working Paper Text
    • Working Paper Publication Date: April 2009
    • HBS Working Paper Number: 09-095
    • Faculty Unit(s): Strategy
      Trending
        • 31 May 2023
        • HBS Case

        From Prison Cell to Nike’s C-Suite: The Journey of Larry Miller

        • 01 Jun 2023
        • HBS Case

        A Nike Executive Hid His Criminal Past to Turn His Life Around. What If He Didn't Have To?

        • 16 May 2023
        • HBS Case

        How KKR Got More by Giving Ownership to the Factory Floor: ‘My Kids Are Going to College!’

        • 23 May 2023
        • Research & Ideas

        Face Value: Do Certain Physical Features Help People Get Ahead?

        • 31 May 2023
        • HBS Case

        Why Business Leaders Need to Hear Larry Miller's Story

    Find Related Articles
    • Corporate Strategy
    • Brands and Branding
    • Strategy
    • Price
    • Competition
    • Video Game
    • Web Services

    Sign up for our weekly newsletter

    Interested in improving your business? Learn about fresh research and ideas from Harvard Business School faculty.
    This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
    ǁ
    Campus Map
    Harvard Business School Working Knowledge
    Baker Library | Bloomberg Center
    Soldiers Field
    Boston, MA 02163
    Email: Editor-in-Chief
    →Map & Directions
    →More Contact Information
    • Make a Gift
    • Site Map
    • Jobs
    • Harvard University
    • Trademarks
    • Policies
    • Accessibility
    • Digital Accessibility
    Copyright © President & Fellows of Harvard College