Skip to Main Content
HBS Home
  • About
  • Academic Programs
  • Alumni
  • Faculty & Research
  • Baker Library
  • Giving
  • Harvard Business Review
  • Initiatives
  • News
  • Recruit
  • Map / Directions
Working Knowledge
Business Research for Business Leaders
  • Browse All Articles
  • Popular Articles
  • Cold Call Podcasts
  • About Us
  • Leadership
  • Marketing
  • Finance
  • Management
  • Entrepreneurship
  • All Topics...
  • Topics
    • COVID-19
    • Entrepreneurship
    • Finance
    • Gender
    • Globalization
    • Leadership
    • Management
    • Negotiation
    • Social Enterprise
    • Strategy
  • Sections
    • Book
    • Cold Call Podcast
    • HBS Case
    • In Practice
    • Lessons from the Classroom
    • Op-Ed
    • Research & Ideas
    • Research Event
    • Sharpening Your Skills
    • What Do You Think?
    • Working Paper Summaries
  • Browse All
    • COVID-19 Business Impact Center
      COVID-19 Business Impact Center
      Political Influence and Merger Antitrust Reviews
      04 Jun 2019Working Paper Summaries

      Political Influence and Merger Antitrust Reviews

      by Mihir N. Mehta, Suraj Srinivasan, and Wanli Zhao
      This paper uses a large sample of United States mergers between 1998 and 2010 to study how political connections help firms obtain favorable antitrust regulatory outcomes for mergers. Given that antitrust regulators are subject to congressional oversight, the authors predict and find evidence that outcomes systematically favor firms that are constituents of politicians serving on judiciary committees.
      LinkedIn
      Email

      Author Abstract

      Antitrust regulators play a critical role in protecting market competition. We examine whether firms can use the political process to opportunistically influence antitrust reviews of corporate merger transactions. We exploit the fact that in some mergers, acquirers and/or targets are connected to powerful U.S. politicians that serve on the two congressional committees with antitrust regulator oversight. We find that merger parties with these connections receive relatively favorable antitrust review outcomes. To establish a causal link, we use plausibly exogenous shocks to firm-politician links and a falsification test. Politician incentives to influence merger antitrust review outcomes appear to be driven by lobbying, contributions, and prior business connections. In sum, our findings suggest that political interference affects the ability of antitrust regulators to provide independent recommendations about the anti-competitive effects of mergers.

      Paper Information

      • Full Working Paper Text
      • Working Paper Publication Date: May 2019
      • HBS Working Paper Number: HBS Working Paper #19-114
      • Faculty Unit(s): Accounting and Management
        Trending
          • 24 Feb 2021
          • Lessons from the Classroom

          What History's Biggest Wars Teach Us About Leading in Peace

          • 25 Feb 2019
          • Research & Ideas

          How Gender Stereotypes Kill a Woman’s Self-Confidence

          • 17 May 2017
          • Research & Ideas

          Minorities Who 'Whiten' Job Resumes Get More Interviews

          • 13 Jul 2020
          • Research & Ideas

          Merck CEO Ken Frazier Discusses a COVID Cure, Racism, and Why Leaders Need to Walk the Talk

          • 09 Feb 2021
          • Cold Call Podcast

          Developing Resilience on the Path to Becoming a CEO

      Suraj Srinivasan
      Suraj Srinivasan
      Philip J. Stomberg Professor of Business Administration
      Unit Head, Accounting and Management
      Contact
      Send an email
      → More Articles
      Find Related Articles
      • Mergers and Acquisitions
      • Business and Government Relations
      • Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms

      Sign up for our weekly newsletter

      Interested in improving your business? Learn about fresh research and ideas from Harvard Business School faculty.
      ǁ
      Campus Map
      Harvard Business School Working Knowledge
      Baker Library | Bloomberg Center
      Soldiers Field
      Boston, MA 02163
      Email: Editor-in-Chief
      →Map & Directions
      →More Contact Information
      • Make a Gift
      • Site Map
      • Jobs
      • Harvard University
      • Trademarks
      • Policies
      • Digital Accessibility
      Copyright © President & Fellows of Harvard College